Supermarkets have spread extremely rapidly in developing countries after the 'take-off' in the early to mid-1990s. Former analyses of supermarket diffusion have not adequately explained the sudden burst and then exponential diffusion of supermarkets in the late-1990s and early-2000s. We argue that rather than taking demand and market institutional and organizational conditions as "exogenous", as former analyses have tended to do, modern food retailers instead have treated local conditions as substantially "endogenous". To enable their rapid growth, supermarkets undertake "proactive fast-tracking strategies" to alter the "enabling conditions" of entry and growth. Beside the retail investments that have been extensively treated in recent literature, these proactive strategies focus on improving the "enabling conditions" via (1) procurement system modernization and (2) local supply chain development. One important strategy retailers have used to facilitate (1) and (2) is to form symbiotic relationships with modern wholesale, logistics, and processing firms. An example we address is "follow sourcing", where a transnational retailer encourages transnational logistics and wholesale firms with whom the retailer is working in home markets, to locate to the developing country. This is a spur to globalization of services in support of retail. Follow-sourcing has been treated for example in the automobile manufactures sector (follow-sourcing from spare parts manufacturers) -but not in the food sector. A second important strategy is that of multi-network-sourcing, in which supermarkets source from national, regional, and global networks. We analyze that strategy here, adding to the literature which to date has touched on this theme only scantly, and for the first time identify typical paths, present preliminary evidence (from Central America and Indonesia) concerning this multisourcing-network strategy, and discuss trade implications. One of these is the move to primacy of South-South trade in supermarket sourcing -a new dimension of globalization. By introducing this link of retailer transformation and trade into the literature, we hope to spur a new line of research that is timely in light of the trade, development, and globalization debates in developing countries.
Introduction
Many observers (such as Goldman, 1974) of retailing in developing countries, prior to the 1990s, had been predicting that there was not going to be a fundamental and widespread retail transformation -a diffusion of supermarkets 1 -in the foreseeable future in developing countries. Food cultures, the limited means of the broad masses of urban consumers, plus impediments to local sourcing of products by supermarkets related to poor traditional agri-food supply chains and intermediate distribution sectors, were considered nearly insuperable obstacles to widespread retail modernization. The 'supermarket revolution' in developing countries with its "take-off" in the early-mid 1990s (which we describe in this paper) flies in the face of these earlier predictions, and belies the supposed insuperability of those demand and supply side obstacles. Mere reliance on the steady, exogenous build-up of propitious demand-side conditions was necessary but not sufficient for the massive 'take-off.'
In this paper, we first argue that the rapid take-off of supermarkets was due not only to a set of critical conditions on the demand side, but also to two other factors -an (on-balance) supportive institutional and policy environment (including retail FDI liberalization) in the 1990s, and importantly also to proactive fast-tracking strategies in marketing and procurement by both retail trans-national corporations (TNCs) and leading domestic retailers. These strategies reveal that the leading retailers saw demand and supply-side conditions in food markets as 'endogenous' rather than 'exogenous' -things they could influence to their own gain. Indeed, these retailers have been extraordinarily proactive in both adapting to (as Dicken (2000) terms it, "placing the firm") but also changing the environment (as Dicken terms it, "firming the place"). This twodimensioned lens employed by economic geographers can be used to categorize the interaction of retail TNCs (and we would add, leading domestic retailers as well) and developing country economies, market institutions and trade, and food cultures.
We believe that this interaction is a very major component of globalization and its effects on developing economies. Yet, as Wrigley (2000) and Wrigley et al. (2005) note, the globalization literature has "had remarkably little to say" about the major role of the internationalization of retailing. Moreover, as Coe (2004) , Wrigley et al. (2005) , and Coe and Hess (2005) note, much of the retail internationalization literature (in particular from the business/management perspective) has remained "rather insular and disconnected from broader debates about transnational production systems." The latter debates focus on structural change in the global economy. This insular lack of connection between the 'retail internationalization' literature and the global structural transformation literature has been a problem for decades, as was also noted by Findlay et al. (1990) .
In the past half decade, there has emerged substantial new research in economic geography and agricultural economics that has provided insights and evidence concerning the proactive 1. We use 'supermarkets' throughout the paper as shorthand for the various segments of modern retail, and only distinguish the segments (hypermarkets and superstores, supermarkets and neighborhood stores, convenience and forecourt stores, and discount and club stores) where the need arises. We lump 'cash and carry' stores into modern retail; while they are formally in the wholesale sector, in most developing countries they de facto mix retail and wholesale. strategies of leading retailers in, "the two inter-linked and overlapping dimensions of internationalization -stores and sourcing" (Coe and Hess, 2005: 449) , and thus the links among globalization, the supermarket revolution, and development in developing regions. In this paper we review that recent literature and provide new evidence, with a focus on: 1) the diffusion path of supermarkets in developing countries, and what it implies concerning the "storing" and marketing proactive strategies; 2) the diffusion path and nature of procurement system modernization, and what they imply about proactive sourcing strategies; and 3) the implications for local market institutions and trade. Some three decades after the birth of the supermarket sector in Western Europe and the United States, supermarkets emerged in developing regions (namely Latin America, Asia, Central and Eastern Europe and in parts of Africa). During the 1950s-1980s, the early research (such as Holton, 1953; Galbraith and Holton, 1965; Goldman, 1974; and Findlay et al., 1990 ) that tracked supermarket sector development noted that it took place very slowly, involved primarily domestic chains, and was confined to small pockets of upper-income consumers in large cities.
Diffusion of Supermarkets in Developing Countries
The little growth that was observed was attributed to "demand side" factors such as rising incomes, urbanization, and the rising opportunity costs of women's time to shop. Goldman (1974) observed that the supermarket's consumer "outreach" was so limited because all but a small group of rich consumers just found it too costly, relative to their meager incomes, to pay supermarket prices, pay for transport, break daily shopping habits or buy in bulk and be unable to store perishables without refrigerators. Goldman explained these limitations of supermarkets to the hopeful promoters, in development agencies and academia in the 1960s and 1970s, of supermarket development as a means of increasing food market efficiency by lowering food prices to the urban poor.
Take-off and Rapid Spread of Supermarkets in the 1990s and 2000s
Sharply contrary to the predictions in the pre-'take-off' literature, supermarket development abruptly and spectacularly took off in the early to mid-1990s. Tracing an exponential growth curve, and diffusing in several waves over developing regions as described in this article, supermarkets spread at a dramatic rate. The concept of 'punctuated equilibrium', introduced into the lexicon from the paleobiologist's (Gould and Eldredge, 1977) notion that there are often long evolutionary equilibria, suddenly punctuated by sharp and extremely active periods of rapid evolution, seems relevant here to describe the supermarket revolution in developing countries. Coe (2004) describes this 'take-off' as unprecedented in terms of "sheer rapidity", scale and development impact. Some business management/marketing research literature sensed the early tremors of this retail earthquake in the mid 1990s, such as noted in Alexander (1997) . The recognition of these changes as a full-fledged 'take-off' did not occur until a spate of papers in the 2000s -such as Wrigley (2000) and Coe (2004) among economic geographers, Reardon and Berdegué (2002) and Reardon et al. (2003) among agricultural economists and Dawson and Lee (2004) among marketing researchers.
Post 'take-off' models of the diffusion of supermarkets, such as Wrigley (2000) and note that the demand-side determinants of supermarket diffusion that were identified in the pre-'take-off' literature, such as urbanization and income growth, have proceeded apace. At the same time, additional demand-side factors, such as the diffusion of refrigerators and cheap motorized vehicles (often on the heels of import liberalization and domestic manufactures growth) and better road and bus infrastructure, have increased access of wider circles of consumers to supermarkets. One can say that these demand-side factors are necessary, but not sufficient, to explain the sudden and extreme "supermarket revolution."
The post-'take-off' literature points to additional factors that are of importance to supermarket diffusion; we review these factors in turn below.
First, there was an avalanche of retail foreign direct investment (FDI) into developing countries facilitated by a major policy change towards investment liberalization, mainly in the 1990s but in some countries in the early 2000s. This was fuelled by push factors (including saturated retail markets and planning restrictions on retail locations as well as low margins in home countries) and pull factors (including higher returns, relatively light competition and good prospects due to the demand-side factors noted above) (Wrigley, 2000; Dawson, 2001; Reardon and Berdegué, 2002) . The supermarket sector in the United States and Western Europe was established and grew to maturity mainly by the force of domestic investment. Retail 'internationalization' in these regions played a significant role only late in the game, starting in the 1970s and especially the 1980s (Dawson, 1994) . By contrast, although domestic retail investments have played an important role in developing countries since the early 1990s, retail FDI has been critical in itself, and has spurred competitive activity in what was a rather 'sleepy' domestic retail sector. As the store rate increased and format diversification was undertaken, supermarkets in all forms became accessible to those beyond the pocket of the rich in the large cities, and spread over space and socioeconomic groups.
Second, the fundamental policy change of retail FDI liberalization was buttressed by institutional and regulatory reforms in developing countries. Domestic regulations of the commerce sector can either promote supermarket diffusion or hinder it; the overall corpus of regulations can 'push' and 'pull' both ways with promotion or hindrance winning out in different phases of supermarket diffusion. Reardon and Hopkins (2006) argue that, in developing countries in the past decade, the regulatory balance appears to promote the net diffusion of supermarkets in developing countries, although with inter-country and inter-temporal variation. Further, this policy environment differs sharply from the (constraining) regulatory environment for modern retail in much of the 20 th century in the United States in particular, and also in Western Europe.
Third, the modernization of supermarket procurement systems (treated in detail in Section 3) reduced costs and increased the competitiveness of supermarkets relative to traditional retailers, and of leading supermarkets (that is TNCs and predominant domestic firms) relative to secondtier domestic chains, leading to further impetus for diffusion. The capacity for such modernization was related to procurement technology transfer from trans-national chains and its further diffusion among leading domestic chains Coe, 2004) . The incentive for this was mounting competition as the supermarket sector developed, while increases in quality and product diversity and the decline of product and transaction costs became central competitive strategies. As procurement modernization diffused over countries, chains and products, supermarkets became more competitive relative to traditional retailers and further penetrated food markets.
Waves of Diffusion of Supermarkets over Regions and Countries
The spread of supermarkets has and is taking place in three established waves. A fourth wave is also currently emerging.
The "first wave" countries experienced supermarket-sector take-off in the early to mid-1990s. These countries include much of South America and East Asia outside China (and Japan), Northern-Central Europe and the Baltics, and South Africa. In these countries, the average share of supermarkets in food retail went from roughly only 10-20 percent circa 1990 to 50-60 percent on average by the early 2000s (Reardon and Berdegué, 2002, Reardon et al., 2003) . Compare that to the roughly 75-80 percent share of food retail that supermarkets had by 2005 in the United States and Western Europe, and one sees a process of convergence. Country-specific examples include frontrunners where the supermarket 'take-off' started in the early 1990s, as in Argentina with a 60 percent supermarket share of food retail in 2002 (Gutman, 2002) , Brazil with 75 percent in 2002 (Farina, 2002) , Taiwan with 55 percent in 2003 (Chang, 2005) and the Czech Republic with 55 percent in 2003 . These first wave countries saw supermarket diffusion in a single decade that took some five decades in the United States and the United Kingdom.
There is a second set of countries perched at the 'tail end' of this first wave, with their supermarket 'take-off' in the mid-1990s. Examples include: Costa Rica and Chile with circa 50 percent in 2001 (Reardon and Berdegué, 2002; Berdegué et al., 2005) , South Korea with 50 percent in 2003 (Lee and Reardon, 2005) , Philippines and Thailand with approximately 50 percent each in 2003 (Manalili, 2005 and Thailand Development Research Institute, 2002) , and South Africa with 55 percent in 2001 (Weatherspoon and Reardon, 2003) .
The second-wave countries include Mexico and much of Southeast Asia, Central America, and Southern-Central Europe. In these areas, the share went from circa 5-10 percent in 1990 to 30-50 percent by the early 2000s, with the 'take-off' occurring in the mid to late-1990s. Specific examples include Mexico with a 56 percent share of supermarkets in total retail in 2003 (ANTAD, 2005 , Reardon et al., 2007 , Ecuador with 40 percent in 2003 (Alarcon, 2003) , Colombia with a 47 percent share in 2003 (Hernandez, 2004) , Guatemala with a 36 percent share in 2002 (Orellana and Vasquez, 2004) , Indonesia with a 30 percent share in 2001 (Rangkuti, 2003) and Bulgaria with a 25 percent share in 2003 .
The third-wave countries include countries where the supermarket revolution 'take-off' started only in the late-1990s or early-2000s, reaching about 10-20 percent of national food retail sales by circa 2003-4. These areas include parts of Africa, such as Kenya with 20 percent of urban retail sales (Neven and Reardon, 2004) , some countries in Central and South America, such as Nicaragua with a 20 percent share (Balsevich et al., 2006a) , Peru and Bolivia, Southeast Asia, such as Vietnam (Phan, 2004) , China, India and Russia.
While the African cases fit closely the model of supermarket diffusion (but with constraints showing in all dimensions), the Vietnam, China, India and Russia cases show that a constraint in one or two variables in the model of diffusion can substantially delay the diffusion, and the relaxation of the constraint let go enormous energy toward fast-tracked diffusion. We note the latter below.
China and India are fascinating cases of extremely rapid and recent 'take-off'. Roughly 13 percent of China's overall food retail, and some 30 percent of China's urban food retail were represented by supermarkets in 2003 (Hu et al., 2004) -up from zero at the start of 1990. The overall figure for India is estimated variously, with the India Retail Association estimating it at nine percent (Hindu Business Line, 2007) and six percent (McKinsey, 2006) . Both of these sources concur in the rapid growth of the Indian supermarket sector. Indeed, India and China were the foremost destinations for retail FDI globally in 2004 (Burt, 2004) , with India ranking first and China second in the AT Kearney "Global Retail Development Index" in (Hindu Business Line, 2006 . Both China and India have had for more than a decade several of the demand-side factors in abundance for the take-off, such as rapid urbanization, improving infrastructure, and large emerging middle classes. In both cases, with the progress slowest and most recent in India, policy factors impeding liberalization of retail FDI delayed the "takeoff". But once the liberalization occurred, as it has in China, the diffusion rate is unprecedented. Most observers count on the same occurring in India.
Finally, there is the mere beginnings of an emerging fourth wave in other regions, such as South Asia outside India, Sub-Saharan Africa outside a handful of countries in the second and third waves (principally South Africa, Kenya and Zambia) and the poorer countries in South East Asia (for example Cambodia) and South America (for example Bolivia). It is uncertain how quickly modern retail will diffuse in these countries; it is likely that it will be quite slowly compared to those in the countries of the first three waves.
The above figures concerning the strikingly fast and recent rise of supermarkets in developing countries seem linear, but mask the fact that growth has followed an exponential curve, mostly with the inflection point in the late 1990s. The speed of the sudden change undoubtedly surprised policy-makers and even farmers and food companies, as we will see.
The Supermarket Revolution: Transnationalization versus Domestic Retail Modernization
The above patterns present the aggregate picture, but mask the extent to which the "supermarket revolution" is merely a product of transnationalization of retail, the focus of much of the economic geography and business/management literature to date, or has a substantial domestic component. The (rough) evidence points toward a number of emerging patterns.
First, although the diffusion pattern over space and time of FDI roughly tracks (with some exceptions) the waves of diffusion of supermarkets, our (very rough) estimate of the share of FDI-based retail (in sole or joint ventures) in total modern retail sales averages is only around 50 percent. 2 This is, of course, staggeringly high from the viewpoint of domestic observers of food systems which were almost entirely locally-owned only a decade or two ago. But it is much lower than one would infer from the existing literature's near equation of retail modernization and transnationalization. Of course, this varies a lot over situations; it is higher in first wave than third wave countries, higher in big cities than in small cities, and higher among hypermarket format stores than supermarket format stores. Second, the patterns described above do not remove the role of transnationalization via FDI as a primary driver of the "supermarket revolution" in developing countries. That is, it is incontrovertible that supermarkets occupied only a tiny niche in most countries, with very low rates of investment, until retail FDI arrived or was expected. The frenzy of domestic investment was clearly sparked by the need to compete with or forestall TNCs.
While further research is needed with detailed systematic analysis, there is substantial anecdotal evidence of domestic retailers investing competitively and heavily in the early stages of, or even in anticipation of, TNC entry in order to occupy retail territory, grasp first mover advantages and/or obtain scarce retail realty. There are many examples of this; we note five. (1) In Chile, D&S invested aggressively when it anticipated Wal-mart's entry, and even acquired Ahold's stores in Chile so that it became by far the leading food retailer (Faiguenbaum et al., 2002) . (2) In Indonesia, Matahari invested intensively, roughly striving to match FDI flows, in order to stay the first-ranked retailer in a situation of intense and escalating FDI (Natawidjaja et al., 2006) . (3) In Mexico, the three leading domestic retailers (Soriana, Comercial Mexicana and Gigante) have been investing in a seemingly unsuccessful bid to head-off the massive FDI of Wal-mart (Reardon et al., 2007) . (4) In China, the leading food retail chains (Lianhua, Hualian and Nonggongshan) invested aggressively, aided by government loans due to their quasi-public sector status as well as by selling stocks on the Hong Kong stock exchange, and even worked towards mergers in order to maximize scale, to better compete with the entry of TNCs (Hu et al., 2004) . (5) In India, Reliance, the largest Indian company and now the leading retailer, has implemented plans for large-scale investments over the next five years, anticipating heavy competition from recently formed joint ventures with TNCs by other domestic companies.
Third, while the dominant FDI is from Western European (such as Tesco, Carrefour, Metro, and Ahold) and US transnationals (such as Wal-mart), there is also substantial FDI by regional TNCs. This has been observed among Southeast Asian countries (see Coe and Hess, 2005 and Natawidjaja et al., 2006) , into China (Hu et al., 2004) , and from China into southeast Asia (see Reardon and Timmer, 2006) , into and from India (Economic Times, 2007 and PlanetRetail, 2. The figure we present of 50 percent is far from precisely estimated, but is a rough guess based on figures from a number of studies. Following are illustrations. Based on figures in Reardon and Berdegué (2002) for Latin America (a weighted composite of mainly first and second wave countries) shows that, very roughly, about 50 percent supermarket sales are by foreign retailers, and the rest by domestic retailers. In China (a third wave country) in 2003, the share of foreign retailers was roughly 25 percent based on Hu et al. (2004) . calculate that roughly 80 percent of modern retail sales of food in the Czech Republic (a first wave country) and 20 percent in Slovakia (a second wave country).
2006), and among and into Central and Eastern European countries (such as Slovenian retailers into Croatia or Turkish retailers into Russia) , among Latin American countries (Reardon and Berdegué, 2002) and among Sub-Saharan African countries (Weatherspoon and Reardon, 2003) .
There appear to be complex dynamics, which are under-researched, between developing country regional TNCs and developed country-based TNCs. For example, note that, in the CEE, 'local' regional TNCs made the first moves, which were then followed by the investments of Western-European based TNCs. It is not clear if there are sequential effects, whereby existing firms demonstrate opportunities in the market, inadvertently inducing and perhaps preparing the consumer for the entry of the extra-regional TNC. Rugman and Verbeke (2004) note that 500 TNCs account for 90 percent of global FDI, but that most of these corporations are regional rather than global in that the majority of their sales occur in their home base (in most cases, a point in the "triad" of North America, European Union and Japan). Their spotlight on regional TNCs, in particular those based in developing countries, is an important element of the needed research agenda in developing regions, where the emphasis to date has rather been on the role of triad-based TNCs. Understanding the level and nature of developing-region TNCs may become important to understand forces driving regional market integration. Reardon and Berdegué (2002) and Reardon et al. (2003) note that modern retail chains have had a tendency to start in large cities and then, driven by competition, to spill frenetically into intermediate cities and smaller towns in many countries of the developing world. We now explore this phenomenon in the evolution of the supermarket sector in developing countries. makes an initial exploration of the move of modern retail into small towns in the 'rural space', and its implications for rural non-farm activities. Much of this move has occurred in the past five years in first wave countries and in the past one to two years in second and third wave countries. Typically, these chains use a small/medium-sized format (for example small supermarkets, hard discount stores, mini-markets and/or convenience stores) to penetrate rural towns. A key characteristic of this trend is that a leading chain establishes stores in provincial capitals which causes a 'stampede' of store openings by other leading chains, and then by smaller chains and independents, into small cities and rural towns, spreading even into small rural towns as a strategy to 'occupy territory'. The image is thus of 'dominoes falling' as chains react through spatial diffusion. Below we provide illustrations -all from the past two to three years -from Mexico, Vietnam, Bulgaria, Poland, South Africa, Indonesia, India, and China.
Waves of Diffusion of Supermarkets over Space and Socioeconomic Groups within a Country
The reasons for this spatial diffusion strategy associated with supermarket development in developing countries, as noted in interviews with chain managers by , are as follows. First, analogous to what foreign chains see as the attraction of expanding into developing countries in general, competition is relatively weak and profit rates are relatively high in rural towns relative to urban centers. Second, rural towns represent both their own demand base and draw in large numbers of countryside families who buy mostly processed foods and staples. (See the China case (Hu et al., 2004) and the South Africa case (d'Haese and van Huylenbroeck, 2005) ). This is doubtless facilitated further by substantial commuting of rural workers between the countryside and rural towns for daily work. (For example, half of rural nonfarm income comes from such commuting in rural Chile (Berdegué et al., 2001) .) Thirdly, in the retail 'war', chains are forced to occupy as much territory and as fast as possible to forestall the geographical penetration of their competitors; a 'pied à terre' in a rural town, given fast rates of urbanization, can become a solid position in a small tertiary city a decade later. Fourthly, in many regions there are returning migrants seeking the kind of retail experience they had during their time in urban areas and thus there is demand-pull for rural retail investment. Finally, and which may appear odd to an urban reader, supermarkets and malls in small cities or towns can be major 'tourist attractions' where families spend the day or even weekend. For example, one Argentine chain makes entertainment for rural families a major feature of its outlets in those areas (Gutman, 2002) .
Moreover, as modern retail spreads, there tends to be format diversification to facilitate the spatial and consumer segment differentiation. For example, to penetrate the markets of inner cities and small towns where space is limited and product assortment can be narrower, chains use discount stores, convenience stores and small supermarkets. A typical example is shown in Mexico: Wal-mart and Soriana have recently been opening small format supermarkets in smaller towns. To penetrate suburbs and large cities where transportation is available, chains use large supermarket and hypermarket formats. Zoning regulations of course condition these choices; for example, Tesco has been opening small-format 'city centre' stores in downtown Bangkok where it cannot open hypermarkets. Chains also open small, focused 'hard discount' stores and convenience formats to compete on price with traditional neighborhood shops. A typical example is that of the southern Indian supermarket chain Trinethra, who in October 2006 opened a chain of Trinethra Quick Shop, selling the 3000 products (or more specifically shop keeping units -SKUs) that represent 70-80 percent of its supermarket sales (PlanetRetail, 2006) . This format is larger than a convenience store in assortment, but smaller than a supermarket and can focus on inner-city settings where traditional shops dominate.
Finally, controlling for the pattern of spatial diffusion, there are similar waves of diffusion over socioeconomic groups cum consumer segments. Obeying the same business logic as in spatial diffusion, supermarkets focus first on upper-income consumer segments (national and expatriate). They then move into the middle class and finally into the markets of the urban poor. Note that the penetration rates beyond the initial core of a chain's operation (notably large city upper-income segments) depend on several inter-related factors, namely: 1) the wave -the more advanced the general penetration, the broader the diffusion; 2) the degree of procurement system modernization of the leading chains -hence cost reduction which can be passed on, while maintaining profits, into price reductions to win over poorer consumers; and 3) the product category -with broader diffusion in processed product retail, second in semi-processed and last in fresh products. Thus, for example, the typical small store of the Lianhua chain, operating in the small towns in the hinterland of Zhejiang in China (hence a first wave internal zone in a third wave country), carries cheap dry goods for poor consumers, but no produce, while a Carrefour hypermarket in Shanghai carries a full line of fresh products that would rival its stores in Paris.
Waves of Diffusion of Supermarkets over Product Markets by Category
The average growth rates in supermarket retail sales reported above mask significant interproduct variation in market penetration (Reardon and Berdegué, 2006) . The first wave of product penetration is typically in processed foods (including canned, dry and packaged items such as rice, noodles, and edible oils). This is due to the existence of significant economies of scale in procurement as well as direct relations with processed food manufacturers. Typical of many developing countries, in China supermarkets very quickly took over staples and packaged food retail in the top 60 cities in the late 1990s to early 2000s (ACNielsen, 2002) . This mirrored a similar evolution in Hong Kong in the 1980s (Goldman et al., 1999) and in Argentina in the 1980s and 1990s (Gutman, 2002) .
The second wave is in semi-processed foods with extensive or minimal processing (such as dairy products) and minimal processing/packing (such as chicken, pork, beef, and fruit). Supermarket chains again have advantages over traditional food retail stores and wetmarket operators due to economies of scale and relations with major processors and packers. Goldman et al. (1999) illustrate this in the case of Hong Kong where supermarkets gained a dominant market share quickly in the 1980s and 1990s for fruit and meats, but had difficulties making major headway in markets for fish and vegetables (as discussed below). For chicken in Argentina (Gutman, 2002) and beef in Chile (Faiguenbaum et al., 2002) and Costa Rica (Balsevich et al., 2006b) , supermarkets quickly penetrated the market where large chilling facilities existed and it was possible to extract lower prices from processors relative to those received by traditional butchers. The exceptions, however, are where meat is not a commodity, but rather a highly differentiated product, such as with beef in Argentina (Gutman, 2002) .) Other shocks further increase the supermarket share of retail sales. Phan and Reardon (2006) show that there was a large shift in consumer poultry purchase from small shops and wet markets to supermarkets due to avian influenza in Vietnam. Typically, supermarkets also rapidly dominate retail markets for dairy products, and at the same time stimulate market development and product diversification, as in China (Hu et al., 2004b) , Russia (Dries and Reardon, 2005) Zambia (Neven et al., 2006b) , Poland (Wilkin et al., 2006) Chile (Faiguenbaum et al., 2002) , and Brazil and Argentina (Farina et al., 2005) .
The third (product market) wave is by far the slowest and the longest in being established in developing countries: supermarket dominance of vegetable markets, and in particular leafy vegetables. Historically, this was also the case in the United States, where supermarkets very slowly replaced fruit shops and green/wet-markets (where consumers had traditionally done daily shopping) over the period 1920 to the 1960s (Levenstein 1988 ). The same is true in France, where the supermarket share of retail food sales was 80 percent in 1997 but the share of fruit and vegetables sales was only 61 percent. However, supermarkets had only accounted for 35 percent of retail sales of fruit and vegetables in 1971; thus, their share nearly doubled in only three decades, a major shift in a country where it was assumed that modern retail would … never… penetrate the traditional, culturally-cherished produce retail system (Codron et al., 2003) .
A rough rule of thumb emerging from empirical studies is that the share of supermarkets in fresh produce retail markets is lower than its share in overall food retail, and that this gap closes as the latter rises. For instance, the share of supermarkets in fresh produce retail in Guatemala is about 10 percent where their share in overall food retail is about 35 percent, hence the market penetration rate for produce is one-third of overall food market penetration. By contrast, the shares of overall retail food sales and fruit and vegetables are 56 percent and 25 percent respectively in Mexico (Reardon et al., 2007; ANTAD, 2005) and 75 percent versus 50 percent respectively in Brazil (Farina, 2002) .
Hence, at earlier stages of supermarket development, the freshness, convenience and lower cost of small produce shops and wet markets tend to dominate retail markets for fresh produce. However, this changes over time as supermarkets modernize vegetable procurement (see below), imitate wet markets in marketing techniques and make gains in commodity vegetables. Arieh Goldman has examined this question closely, comparing consumption shares in China versus Hong Kong. In a new study among a random sample of 1200 consumers in the six largest cities in China, Goldman and Vanhonacker (2006) show that modern retailers have a retail market share of 94 percent for non-food, 79 percent for packaged/processed goods, 55 percent for baked goods, 46 percent for meat, 37 percent for fruit, 35 percent for poultry and 33 percent for fish, but only 22 percent for vegetables. Even in Hong Kong, supermarkets have a 59 percent share of fruit retail sales, and a 55 percent share for vegetables (Coca-Cola Retailing Research Council Asia, 2005) . This shows that, well into the ubiquity of supermarkets in advanced supermarketpenetration cases such as Hong Kong, small shops and wet markets still maintain nearly half the market for vegetables). A similar finding is shown in Mexico by ANTAD (2005) , reporting the supermarket share in fresh produce markets at 25 percent in 2005, versus 53 percent for cheese and 84 percent for packaged foods. However, there is evidence from a large ACNielsen consumer survey in Asia (reported in PlanetRetail, 2005) that younger consumers are forsaking wetmarkets and ACNielsen posits that, in less than a generation, fresh produce buyers will be substantially more supermarket-oriented, which will accelerate effects of the 'supermarket revolution' on the horticultural sector.
Procurement Strategies of Supermarkets to 'Proactively Fast-Track' Diffusion
The globalization literature in the second half of the 1990s and early 2000s made major strides in understanding the global procurement systems of retailers (and manufacturers) with headquarters in Western Europe and North America. A key part of this work focused on global value chains (GVC) starting in the 'south' and ending in the 'North', for example for automobiles (Humphrey, 2003) , apparel (Gereffi, 1999) , cocoa-chocolate (Fold, 2002) , coffee (Talbot, 2004, and Ponte and Giovannucci, 2005) , and fresh produce (Barrett et al., 1999; Dolan and Humphrey, 2000; Jaffee, 2003) .
Some of this work emphasized the transmission of emergent private standards to developing country export sectors, both via GVCs sending products to the 'North' and retailers and manufacturers located, via FDI, in the 'South' and sourcing locally (Dolan and Humphrey, 2000; Reardon et al., 2001 Baron, 2005; Henson and Reardon, 2005; Henson, 2006) . Retailers with international sourcing hubs in the 'South' might not yet be retailing in the country where the hub is located, as was the case with Wal-mart and Tesco in India in (PlanetRetail, 2005 . Alternatively, they might open sourcing hubs in countries or regions where they eventually undertake retail FDI, as the case of Wal-mart in India (PlanetRetail, 2006) or Metro in India and Vietnam (Planet Retail, 2005; . We return to these points below when discussing the potential trade impacts of the 'supermarket revolution' in developing countries.
However, there has been less and only more recent attention to the sourcing strategies of modern retailers in developing countries to supply their retailing operations locally and in those regions. This is the nexus of the 'supermarket revolution' and impacts on local and regional supply chains, trade and market institutions -a nexus of which Wrigley et al. (2005) write: "… very little research has been undertaken on processes of supply chain restructuring [we add the context: due to entry of retail TNC firms] in the emerging market host economies. Further, regarding local and regional sourcing by retailers operating in developing countries, Coe and Hess (2005) note: "… this is dramatically under-researched in comparison to work on global sourcing, a surprising situation given the stubbornly local nature of food sourcing in particular."
We can broaden the concern raised by Wrigley et al. (2005) to ask in what ways leading retailers, either the half that are TNCs or the half that are domestic supermarket chains, are modernizing their procurement practices and how this affects local and regional supply chains. We spend the rest of the section on this issue. Recent research in agricultural economics 3 , economic geography 4 and marketing 5 in the first half of the 2000s has begun to provide evidence for trends in the diffusion of procurement system change among supermarkets operating in developing countries. There is somewhat more emphasis on TNCs per se in the economic geography and marketing literature than the agricultural economics literature. However, the essence of the points these literatures raise do not diverge over disciplines or regions studied; the emerging trends are outlined below.
Note that the degree to, and manner in which, procurement systems are modernizing is a main driver of how the 'supermarket revolution' affects the upstream components of the supply chain, including wholesalers, processors, farmers, and input firms. It is thus also the main determinant of the impact of the transformation of urban retail markets on rural development. To illustrate this point one must merely imagine a scenario whereby supermarkets evolve without procurement modernization. Here, the new supermarkets, however much they impact the retail sector, would just keep sourcing from traditional brokers and wholesale markets, while farmers and processors would see little change in the nature of the markets they face. By contrast, as supermarkets rise to dominate the retail sector and they modernize their procurement systems, farmers and processors see profound changes to the markets they face.
Below we review evidence on the central tendencies of these procurement trends and contribute new material focused on the trade and the supply chain impact dimensions. The evidence for the patterns of modernization diffusion comes primarily from case studies of retailers drawn from the papers cited in the references as well as other country case studies. The evidence reviewed or presented in these papers focuses on cases in Asia (China, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, South Korea, Thailand, and Vietnam), Africa (Kenya, South Africa, and Zambia), Latin America (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, and Paraguay), North Africa and West Asia (Morocco and Turkey), and Central and Eastern Europe (Croatia, Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Russia, and Slovakia). Most interviews were undertaken with both TNCs and domestic retailers, and with the major chains and several second and third tier chains for comparison. Thus, there has been significant sampling over a variety of types of chains and of countries.
Initial Caveat Concerning the Uneven Diffusion of Procurement Modernization
The adoption of retail procurement technology change varies greatly over various dimensions, including chains, products and countries, reflecting the heterogeneity of incentives and capacity over these dimensions. In some contexts, the diffusion curve is at the start of the 'S curve' and in others well advanced, again reminiscent of waves of diffusion. This unevenness of adoption is not specific to developing countries; Kinsey (2004) also notes it in the United States. There are a number of key determinants of the unevenness of changes in procurement technologies, which we now discuss in turn.
First, procurement modernization is in general so far confined to the leading four or five chains (usually a mix of TNCs and large domestic retailers) in each country which have the capacity to undertake the investments such as in distribution centers. This often means several global or regional multinational chains as the early adopters, followed by adoption by a few large domestic chains. The second and third tier retailers (usually domestic and often zone-specific retailers) and independents generally continue to use the traditional system and adopt, if at all, with a significant lag.
Because of the cost reductions afforded by these changes, late adopters can find themselves to be non-competitive and are then targets for the many mergers and acquisitions that occur in countries where supermarkets have a substantial presence. Our interviews reveal that once the dominant chain in a given country shifts to distribution centers for produce and meats, the other leading chains feel under intense pressure to similarly adopt. As in Cochrane's Treadmill (Cochrane, 1958) , once a procurement innovation is made, with the concomitant spike in profits and dip in costs relative to competitors, and then competitors follow suite, the front runner must again innovate, thus pressing forward in this case procurement technological change.
Second, diffusion rates vary by product, roughly mirroring the patterns observed in the penetration of markets described above; first processed foods, then semi-processed and finally fresh. A typical case is observed in Mexico, where the leading chains undertook procurement modernization for processed goods in the late 1980s and early 1990s, aided by parallel modernization of supply systems by major processors, then for semi-fresh food in the mid-1990s.
Only in the past three or four years has there been the beginning of modernization of fresh produce procurement, coinciding in mutual causality with the surge of produce sales through supermarkets from one to two percent of food sales to eight to 10 percent) (Reardon et al., 2007) .
Moreover, there can be substantial variation over sub-categories of products. Berdegué et al. (2005) show that supermarkets in Guatemala moved early (as much as five years ago) to modernize procurement of several large commodities, such as tomatoes and some high-value niche products like lettuce, but have continued to rely on traditional wholesalers for nearly half of their fresh produce, mainly in the medium-and small volume categories. Codron et al. (2004) found similar trends in Turkey and Morocco. Digal and Concepcion (2004) illustrate differential procurement system modernization even within the sourcing of mangoes in the Philippines, showing that chains tend to source processed mangoes centrally and directly from the supplier, while for fresh mangoes they may source in a more decentralized store-by-store or depot-bydepot manner. Factors such as perishability, availability of large suppliers, transaction costs, and seasonality play roles in this regard.
Third, the extent of diffusion of procurement systems differs sharply over countries, correlated inversely with the waves described. This is partially related to the degree of competition due to relative saturation, and partly due to conditions in the country on the supply-side. For example, Wang et al. (2006) make the case that supermarkets in China rely relatively more on traditional wholesale markets, given a similar share in urban retail, than one finds in Southeast Asia, where it is hypothesized that wholesale markets are less developed than in China, and thus the "push factor" to modernize procurement is stronger.
A final caveat is in order both with respect to retail and to procurement modernization. We have generalized by focusing on broad waves or sets of countries. But there are individual differences over countries within a general wave-set; those differences include the consumer culture, the institutions and regulations, and the specifics of the business cultures and supply chain regimes. Of necessity, as we aim at some tractable generalizations, we abstract from much of this intercountry variation within the "waves", but believe that such specifics are important to countryspecific research and comparisons.
Retail Transformation and Procurement Re-Organization: Links with Trade

Towards an Analysis of the Links among Trade, Retail Transformation, and Procurement Organization Change
As a retail chain grows, there is a tendency to shift from a fragmented and per-store procurement system to a distribution center-based system that serves several stores over space. The spatial units can be national, regional, or global.
Where procurement systems are nationally-based, a retailer may shift from a local-local procurement system (per store from local suppliers in the zone) to a national-local system, sourcing in a network over the entire country. That network may have one or several central nodes served by Distribution Centers (DCs) with a warehouse system around the country. This de-fragments or integrates the market, and is usually accompanied by substantial cost savings from lower congestion, search for suppliers, quality monitoring and coordination costs, as well as the risks of supply hold-ups . These cost savings are, at least in part, offset by higher transport costs, although the net cost savings can be substantial. For example, the Vanguard Chain based in Hong Kong notes that it saved 40 percent in distribution costs by moving to a centralized system with two large DCs in Southern China (China Resources Enterprise, 2002) . The recorded costs savings are similar in the few available studies, for example in Costa Rica and Brazil.
In the case of regional procurement systems, a national supermarket chain spreads into other countries in its region to become a regional chain (for example the expansion into South East and South Asia by the Hong Kong-based chain Dairy Farm International), or as a global chain sets up retailing operations in several countries in a given region (for example the expansion over several East and Southeast Asian countries by Tesco, or Ahold and Wal-mart's entry to Central America). An economically-logical step, paralleling the "in-country" discussion above, is to establish a regional procurement network. Analogous to the points above, a regional network allows for savings on a similar set of costs. The next logical step is to set up global sourcing networks.
However, several contextual qualifications to the progression are needed. First, although we present the above list of spatial units as an apparent progression of "economically-logical steps", there is no sequence necessarily in practice. For example, for a given product, a global retailer could enter a country and source the product only from its pre-existing global or regional network, whether before or after it had set up a national sourcing network in that country. Alternatively, a regional retailer may use a global network. For example, the Asian regional retailer Dairy Farm International sources some products via the World-Wide Retail Exchange (WWRE), operated by a consortium of global and regional retailers (WWRE, 2000) .
Second, a retailer may include a country in its regional or global sourcing network before it begins retailing in that country, or concurrently with the early stages of the retail operation. In fact, an emphasis on this trend is a recent inheritance of the globalization literature that has emphasized retailers in the "North" sourcing from the "South" through their global sourcing networks. Examples are the use by TNCs of their local sourcing bases as 'export platforms' to their operations outside the region, as discussed in Coe and Hess (2005) for retailers in Central Europe and Southeast Asia, in Wrigley (2005) for Tesco in Thailand, PlanetRetail (2005) for Metro in India, Baron (2005) for Carrefour in China, Mais y Mais (2004) for Carrefour in Brazil, Reardon and Berdegué (2002) for Ahold's sourcing of apples from Chile for is stores in Peru, Argentina, and Central America, and Reardon et al. (2007) for Wal-mart and HEB Grocers in Mexico.
Third, the globalization literature in general, as well as the marketing and economic geography literature dealing with international retail in particular, has tended to emphasize the third type of market integration, through global sourcing by retail TNCs. For example, Coe and Hess (2005) , for Southeast Asia and Central Europe, and Baron (2005) , focus mainly on how TNCs source from those developing regions in order to supply stores in Western Europe.
Yet new evidence points to the major -and in fact overwhelmingly -greater importance, within the developing country context, of local sourcing and regional sourcing, hence the first two in our list above. On the one hand, local sourcing and market integration through national networks is of established and crucial importance. Coe and Hess (2005) note that modern retailers (they cite Ahold, Carrefour, and Tesco as among their case studies) operating in developing regions source some 90 percent of their food products from local sources, instead of imports. They note that these can be processed products from TNCs operating in the country, or they might have been on-imported by those firms, although it is by far more common even for foreign companies in a developing country to produce the processed product in that country rather than importing it. Regmi and Gehlhar (2005) provide a precise estimate of this, noting that US processed food firms operating abroad produce and sell locally five times more than US processing firms export to foreign countries. Reardon and Berdegué (2002) also emphasize local sourcing as the main source of fresh produce for supermarkets in Latin America; they make a rough calculation that supermarkets in Latin America (even five years ago) source and sell locally 2.5 times more fresh produce than is exported from Latin America -despite the globalization debate keeping a firm and narrow focus on those exports rather than the tumultuous change in the local food economy induced mainly by globalization's other face, retail FDI.
On the other hand, regional sourcing and regional procurement networks are of emerging importance. The data are not yet gathered to allow a precise estimation of the role of these regional networks in the food products sourcing by retailers operating in developing countries; however, in the next section we show that for produce imported by retailers in Central America and Indonesia, imports from the "South" (the same or other developing regions) by far dominate imports from the "North." Reardon and Berdegué (2002) , Berdegué et al. (2005) , and Reardon et al. (2005) note that there is evidence in South America, Central America, and East/Southeast Asia of emerging regional sourcing networks for fresh produce by both regional and global TNCs operating in those regions. We feel that this is of particular interest because it points to a new and strong trend of the supermarket revolution spurring "South-South" trade among countries in a given developing region ('intra-South' trade) and between developing regions ('inter-South' trade). For instance, Dairy Farm, Carrefour, as well as national chains such as Matahari in Indonesia, Metro in Vietnam, Tesco in Thailand and E-Mart in South Korea, source fruit and vegetables from China to sell in their local stores in those countries. Moreover, Hualian (China) is sourcing milk products from Mongolia and Australia under private label (Hu et al., 2004a) . We obtained new evidence for this paper for examples of this for produce in Central America and Indonesia, and present this below.
Finally, the emerging evidence is revealing a complex set of potential "paths" for retailers to take the three steps from national, through regional to global sourcing networks. The reader will see that the potential, and evidence on the realized, paths of the internationalization of networks do not display the steady, monotonic shift from purely domestic sourcing to simple international buying to integrated, coordinated, strategic global sourcing -steps which one finds in early papers on global sourcing in the supply chain literature such as Monczka and Trent (1991) . The greater complexity and variety of paths for food retailers might be due to the wider variety of products, the interest in maximizing local sourcing for cost, freshness, and "local appeal" to customers, and the rapid evolution of packaging, processing, and storage technologies for foods.
We list here several potential "sourcing evolution paths". In each case, the horizontal axis is time, and the vertical axis, reliance on trade.
(1) A reverse-J curve for exports first (without retailing) and then shifting to using the same supply base for local sourcing: this is where the TNC retailer builds an export platform in a country and then subsequently begins retailing in that country; this is the case of Metro in India, which we discuss below. For example, Carrefour established a joint venture with Qingdao Binhua Industry in China to source local frozen strawberries for export them through its regional and global network to its stores in Indonesia, Thailand, Malaysia, Brazil, Spain, and the UK, and also then supplied its China stores with the product (www.binhua.cn).
(2) A J-curve with local sourcing (for local retailing) first and then exports from the local source. An example is where the CSU regional chain built local sourcing of beef in Nicaragua and then once established, exported to the Costa Rican stores (Balsevich et al., 2006b ).
(3) A "reverse-J curve" for imports progressively supplanted by local sourcing: where the retailer at first relies on imports (from regional or global networks) and then shifts to local sourcing: this is noted by Coe and Hess (2005) for processed foods in Southeast Asia, by Berdegué et al. (2005) for vegetables in Nicaragua; (4) A "J-curve" for local sourcing then imports: where the retailer at first relies on local sourcing and then shifts to imports as higher quality or lower cost products are identified; this is noted by Natawidjaja et al. (2007) for oranges and carrots in Indonesia.
(5) Rather than a curve or path, a single point with stasis; for example, a continuous importation of camembert, or a continuous local sourcing of commodity cabbage. That stasis might be itself a combination; sometimes the building of the local source is concurrently for supplying the local stores and for exporting. An example is Carrefour which selected melon producers in Northeast Brazil in 2001 to supply its Brazil stores and Carrefour stores in 21 other countries through its global network (Reardon and Berdegué, 2002) .
Of course, in many cases any combination of the above can be observed at any point in time for any particular retailer. Further, a given product might be "on" a given sourcing evolution path at one time and then in another period move to a different path -like a Markov chain process. The result over a number of periods might appear for example as an "U curve" where the retailer begins by sourcing a product from global sourcing, then promotes a supply chain locally and reduces imports, but then again increases imports but this time from regional sources as its subsidiaries in the region develop local sources and work them into the regional supply system for the chain. A variant on this is where the third stage relates not to imports from, but rather exports to, the region. An example is shown below where, at first, CSU (now part of Wal-mart) substituted Nicaraguan produce in its Nicaraguan stores for imports of Costa Rican produce; eventually, Nicaragua became a source of cheap but high quality produce to send to stores in other countries in the region, including now back to Costa Rica as well as other countries with Wal-mart stores, such as Honduras and Guatemala.
The choice at a given time of a sourcing strategy, in terms of whether and how much the product is bought locally, imported from regional sources, imported from global sources, and/or exported, is, conceptually, a function of a complex set of variables. As such, the choice will be case specific, varying by country, retailer, and product. This will then vary over time as a function of the development of regional sources of the product, the development of local supply chains, policies such as tariffs, and so on. We do not attempt a systematic analysis here, but only offer several examples (from Nicaragua and Indonesia) below to illustrate the general lines of the kinds of factors conditioning the procurement geography choices.
To our knowledge, there has as yet been no systematic research on the geography of sourcing by modern food retailers in developing countries, from and to the local, regional and global sources -either in terms of the static picture of sourcing now, nor the evolutionary sourcing path it is taking. The anecdotes and case illustrations we have to date are just enough to "flesh out" the analytical and empirical categories and variables for the analysis. Many questions beg for answers: Do the regional and global networks make for net trade creation? Is there a trade composition effect, for example more non-staples, higher quality and/or less or more processed products? Will these products be sourced from larger or smaller suppliers? Is there a trade standards effect at work -while global chains require adherence with stringent private standards when exporting from their supply base in a developing region to Europe, do they apply these standards in exporting or importing South-South? Further, is this a vector for standards diffusion over Southern regions? These are important questions for further research that have strong implications for policy-makers and businesses.
The immediacy of the need for research on this subject is justified for several reasons. First, by promoting the development of local suppliers to enter regional and global sourcing networks, retailers might play an increasingly important role in national competitiveness. Second, as supermarkets "take over" food retailing, they become the drivers of the overall food system, likely including trade; there is already evidence, presented below, that supermarkets move to source directly from foreign countries or through specialized wholesalers when they import or export, which implies that the intermediary system of trade is influenced by retail modernization. Third, the geography, as well as the economics, of quality and cost sought by the retailers in their sourcing systems, can be hypothesized to affect the level, composition, and institutions of trade. Fourth, it is crucial to understand how the 'supermarket revolution' is conditioning 'South' regional market integration, a key objective of governments in these regions. We believe that the biggest competitiveness challenges for 'South' producers will come increasingly from other countries in the 'South'.
Finally, understanding the geography of procurement system evolution allows policymakers to see changes in trade as "endogenous" to procurement strategies of major food companies that are increasingly dominating their food economies and thus trade as well, and thus to design competitiveness strategies. For example, say that the reader is in the Ministry of Agriculture of Honduras, and finds that the major retailer in the region is helping suppliers of plantains in Nicaragua to export to their stores in Honduras. The reader could not have predicted that from past trade data -but only by understanding the retailer's strategy. The Ministry in Honduras could then gear its plantain improvement program to be competitive or complementary, but with the knowledge that the context is not the sleepy traditional market but rather now sharp competition from inside the region. Further, modern retail may be or become a key political proponent in the process of trade policy reform; it appears to be in supermarket chains' interest to have as much fluidity as possible from liberalized trade, and so large retailers may be major players in the trade policy debates of the future.
More generally, it is likely this will become a "hot topic" politically. There is growing fear among producers and governments in developing regions that the supermarket chains are highly efficient 'Trojan horses' of imported goods. Complaints abound about the large amount of fresh produce from China and Thailand in Indonesian stores (Natawidjaja et al., 2007) , South African produce in Tanzanian and Zambian stores (Weatherspoon and Reardon, 2003) , Chinese and Chilean produce in Mexican stores (Reardon et al., 2007) . At the same time these very examples illustrate that 'South'-'South' globalization competition is likely to be an increasingly prominent issue, perhaps dwarfing the 'North'-'South' focus that tends to predominate today.
Illustrations from Nicaragua and Indonesia of Emerging Links between horticultural trade and retail transformation
Nicaragua
6 . Over the past five years, the main supermarket chain in Nicaragua has gone from being Costa Rican (as a regional investment of CSU, or Corporacion de Supermercados Unidos), to being Dutch (as Ahold became a majority partner in a joint venture with CSU and a Guatemalan chain, La Fragua; see Wrigley and Currah, 2003 , for a description of the nature of this joint venture), to becoming, over the past year, American (as Wal-mart took Ahold's place). This chain's produce sales have maintained the same product category composition in value terms (fruit is 70 percent and vegetables are 30 percent of sales). However, the procurement system geography has evolved.
Foreign sourcing of fruit has increased somewhat (from 60 percent five years ago to 70 percent today). Five years ago, 60 percent of the imports came from the "South", with 35 percent from Chile and 25 percent from Central America, and the rest, 40 percent, came from the USA. Today Chile has 60 percent and the US has 30 percent (mainly of apples and grapes), and Central America dropped to only 10 percent (with mainly pineapples and melons from Costa Rica, which are also exported to Wal-mart stores in Puerto Rico, Mexico, and the US as part of regional and global sourcing). Thus, while the South's portion increased, there was mainly South-South competition, as there was a radical shift toward sourcing from Chile and away from Central America.
By contrast, foreign sourcing of vegetables constituted 40 percent of vegetables sales five years ago, but dropped to only 15 percent today. Due to supply chain improvements locally in Nicaragua, there has been massive import substitution (in the low and medium tier commodity vegetables, such as tomatoes, onions, plantains, commodity lettuce, peppers, and squash) away from what were mainly vegetable imports from Costa Rica, and a bit from Guatemala, Mexico, and China. Local garlic actually triumphed over Chinese garlic, and Costa Rica is competing only with quality niche crops such as specialty greens from greenhouses. Moreover, as green plantains are classed as a vegetable by them, the build up of the local supply chain allowed both import substitution and now exports from Nicaragua via the regional sourcing network.
In sum, the import share of overall produce rose from 40 to 50 percent in the past five years. There was an increase in fruit imports (with Chile, hence South-South competition, the clear winner). This is a case of a weak "J curve", with a shift to importing and a radical shift in the geography of the sourcing (toward the greater region and away from the local sub-region). There was a decrease in vegetable imports, with a very sharp "reverse-J curve" with an increase in local sourcing, and even a move to make the local sourcing an export platform to the local sub-region. These cases show that the geographic evolution of sourcing can differ sharply over product categories (in particular, depending on the ability to improve local supply chains and compete with foreign sources).
Indonesia:
7 Across the supermarket chains studied, the shares of fruit and vegetables in total produce sales are roughly 65 and 35 percent, respectively (similar to Central America). However, unlike Central America, these shares have changed radically over the past decade -a decade ago, when supermarkets in Indonesia were just beginning to sell fresh produce, fruit accounted for almost 100% of sales.
A decade ago, nearly all fruit was imported (mainly apples from the US). In the late 1990s there was a surge of procurement of local fruit and by 2000 the import share had dipped to 60 percent, with 40% locally sourced. However, severe problems with local supply chains (that continue unabated) led to a shift back to imports over the next six years. There was in fact a "textbook" case of a U curve, first with extremely high imports from global sources (mainly the US), then a dip in imports as local supply sources were tried (and then rejected), and then a surge of imports again, to reach 70-80 percent on average of fruit sales. But there was a radical shift in import sources toward "South-South" trade. Currently the leading fruits sold are imports from China and Thailand and some from Pakistan (notably oranges, Asian pears, apples, and durian, with mango off-season), with grapes from Chile, South Africa, and the US. The retailers noted that there has been a major (and continuing) shift of sourcing apples from the US to China. In fact, the retailers reported that nearly all their fruit imports are now coming from the "South" except mainly for grapes from the US. Simply put, China out-competed the "North" on fruit on cost while coming up to the same quality. Moreover, while an important share of the imports are of fruit not produced in Indonesia (apples, pears), there are many overlaps where there is either competition (oranges) or inter-season complementarity (durian, mangoes).
Large specialized wholesalers have emerged over the past decade to supply imported fruit to supermarkets as well as wholesale markets in Indonesia. It is a very concentrated wholesale segment, especially compared with the domestic fruit wholesale. The TNCs have, however, 7. This illustration comes from interviews with the top national chain (Matahari), several TNCs (Carrefour, Giant (Dairy Farm International, based in Hong Kong), and Makro), and several small local chains (Yogya and Borma in West Java), summarized in Natawidjaja et al. (2007) . begun to shift toward direct sourcing to cut out the local wholesale margin. For example, Carrefour and Makro source much of their imported fruit from their Asian sourcing hubs in China and Thailand. We posit that the global TNCs regional sourcing networks have aided the shift to regional sourcing, controlling for the massive supply side measures taken by the Chinese and Thais to increase quality fruit output.
By contrast, foreign sourcing of vegetables constitutes only about 20 percent of vegetables -up from near zero percent five years ago. This is the opposite story to that of Central America, however. Instead of shifting toward local sourcing, the shift is away -toward mainly regional sourcing from the "South" -in particular of items like carrots and garlic and leeks from China. Supermarket chains have found they can get better and more consistent quality on these items, at a lower product and transaction cost, than by using the local (very poor) supply chains.
In sum, the import share of overall produce traced over a decade a "U curve", coming to overall 60 percent. (Note that this is somewhat above the (50%) reliance on imports by supermarkets in Central America. But both of these should be compared to the approximately 20-30% import share in produce in Mexican supermarkets (Reardon et al. 2007 ).) As in Central America, the very clear winners were "South" exporters, in the same region, again, as in Central America, partially displacing the North's exports to the South's supermarkets. A major difference with the Central America case is, however, the absence of good news for local farmers of a shift in sourcing of commodity vegetables from local farmers.
Retail Transformation and Market Institution Change -Emerging Private Standards and Contracts
Private Standards
The rise of private quality and safety standards implemented by supermarkets, as well as private enforcement of public standards, has become a dominant mechanism through which supply chains are governed Henson and Reardon, 2005) . While food retailing in these regions previously operated in traditional markets, whether in the formal or informal sectors, with little use of certification and formal standards, the emerging trend indicates a rapid rise in the implementation of private codes of practice and other forms of standards. This mirrors similar trends in the industrialized country context (see for example Henson, 2006 and Fulponi, 2006) and, perhaps of most relevance to developing countries, export supply chains to supermarkets, predominantly in Europe and the United States. Similar trends are also being observed in developing countries among larger food processing operations and within the food service sector, both reflecting the requirements of dominant supermarkets being 'pushed down the chain', but also the rise in expectations of consumers with respect to food safety and quality that is being enhanced through the market positioning of the supermarket chains and is being felt across other sectors as well.
The rise of food safety and quality standards reflects the growing use of related product attributes as a means of competition in retail food markets in developing countries, being used by supermarket chains to position themselves relative to competitors and to diminish the focus on price (Henson and Reardon, 2005) . At the same time, private standards are being used to manage supply chains, providing a mechanism for communication, creation and preservation of the food safety and quality attributes of products, and to 'discipline' suppliers. More generally, they function as instruments of coordination along supply chains by standardizing product requirements over suppliers, who may cover many regions or countries. In this way, an effective regime of standards is critical for the establishment of geographically-disbursed procurement systems, of the type discussed above. In so doing, standards specify and harmonize product and delivery attributes, thereby lowering transaction costs and, at least in principle, improving the efficiency of food marketing systems in developing countries.
Private standards of a given supermarket chain may also be designed to ensure, at a minimum, that public standards are met in all of the markets in which it operates; here, private standards act as a more effective and efficient mechanism of enforcement rather than laying down additional requirements per se. Often, in the case of regional and global chains, a common private standard is applied across the chain's operations at some harmonized 'international' level. Thus, supermarket chains can act as a mechanism of 'diffusion' of private standards through regionalizing and globalizing procurement systems, perhaps reducing trade-related costs and having not insignificant trade creation effects in the same manner as the harmonization of public standards internationally (Henson, 2006; Reardon 2006 ).
Implicit Contracts
There is mounting evidence of chains and/or their specialized wholesalers (acting as 'channel captains') entering into 'preferred' supplier relationships, establishing de facto but informal contracts with their suppliers (Hueth et al., 1999) . Besides the meta-conditions for procurement modernization outlined above, including the overall wave of supermarket development, the firm's position in terms of market leadership and/or the type of product involved, supermarkets and/or their specialized wholesalers tend to move from spot markets to preferred supplier lists where there is greatest need for quality and consistency, and where farmers or processors are associated or are individually large. In the latter case there is most scope for reducing transaction costs along the supply chain by establishing longer-term relations with suppliers. Research on the emergence of 'preferred' supplier systems is in its incipience and there are no systematic estimates of the share of producers under such arrangements. It is likely, however, that the numbers involved represent a minor share of the total producers participating in supermarket supply chains channels, simply because modernized procurement system diffusion is so far only partial.
Illustrations of this situation are provided by Boselie (2002) for Ahold in Thailand, Manalili (2005) for Big R in the Philippines and Tesco in Chiang Mai, Digal and Concepcion (2004) for processed mangoes in the Philippines, Hu et al. (2004) for fresh cuts for the Lianhua chain in Shanghai, and Dries and Reardon (2005) for dairy products for Metro in Russia. Again, there has been little systematic empirical analysis to map these situations. Hu et al. (2004) describe the case of Xiaobaiyang, a medium-sized supermarket chain in the Beijing area of China that went from a supply base of 1,000 food manufacturers on a spot market basis to 300 'preferred' suppliers. These suppliers were mainly medium and large firms, who could supply the chain's needs, although not on a 'one-stop shop' basis, but with much lower transaction costs and risks.
'Preferred' supplier contracts are established when the retailer, via their wholesaler or directly, 'lists' a supplier. That listing is usually informal or unwritten, but does represent an effective contract in practice (Hueth et al., 1999) , with delisting imposing costs, whether tangible or intangible. The contracts serves as an incentive to suppliers to commit to the buyer and, over time, make investments in physical and/or human assets specific to the retailer's standards and other specifications. While such asset specificity can provide scope for opportunistic behavior on the part of the supermarket, the supplier gains from having an 'assured' market, provided it continues to meet the customer's requirements. Contracts of this type, even through unwritten, may act as collateral in raising external finance and have significant 'signal value' more widely in promoting the capacity of the firm to meet exacting customer demands. Moreover, the retailer is assured of on-time delivery of products with desired quality attributes.
In some cases, the establishment of 'preferred' supplier relations with producers can entail the provision of direct and/ or indirect assistance. This can take the form of investments in human capital, establishment of managerial capacity, and provision of infrastructure and equipment, or financing for the development of these. Evidence is emerging that for some groups of small farmers, these assistance programs are critical for the up-grading of production and/or marketing capacity, especially where public systems of extension and technical support are weak (World Bank, 2005) . Moreover, there is evidence of inter-linked product and factor markets emerging. For example, inter-relations between output and credit markets are evidenced in farmers' contracts with a supermarket chain serving as a collateral substitute. An illustration is the case of Metro in Croatia that has intervened in the banking sector, indicating that its contracts with suppliers can provide security in the provision of finance for needed greenhouse investments in strawberry production (Reardon et al., 2003b) .
Retail Transformation and Distribution Sector Transformation -Emergence of NewGeneration Wholesalers and Follow-Sourcing of Wholesalers and Logistics Firms
The distribution sector (the supply chain segments between the farmer or processor, and the retailer) is itself transforming in developing countries. Whether the supermarkets drive that transformation (there is mixed evidence concerning the extent of that), it is certain that the supermarkets need and like that transformation, for reasons discussed below.
Traditional food marketing channels are typically "long", involving a number of wholesale merchants (who take possession of the product) and wholesale agents ("brokers", who work on commission and do not take possession). These merchants and agents handle logistics (packing, transport, warehousing and so on) "in-house"; they sell to traditional small retailers; they may be specialized in a product or set of products (such as melons), but not in a specific quality (such as top grade or organic).
By contrast, the emerging modern market channels are shorter, and involve what we term "newgeneration wholesalers" and "third-party logistics (3PL) firms". These firms are specialized in a product or service and a set of related quality attributes, and dedicated, at least relatively, to certain retail and wholesale segments (such as supermarkets and fast-food chains and export markets). They can also provide other services such as the management of the inventory and even the marketing aspects of the produce section for the retailer, as a "channel captain."
The emergence of new-generation wholesalers and 3PL firms helps the retailers: (1) outsource (to these wholesalers) the imposition on producers their private standards and other transaction requirements such as specific packing; (2) face a "shorter" supply chain and thus lower transaction costs; (3) overcome idiosyncratic market failure in logistics and other intermediation services that are common in the traditional food markets of developing countries; (4) reduce market risk by having longer-term relations with distribution companies rather than rely only on the spot market; (5) use incentive pricing and relationships to encourage (or require) wholesalers and third-party logistics firms to undertake supply chain investments, such as in cold chain, or even backward-integrating by investing in a packing plant and organizing contract farming schemes (see Reardon et al. 2007 for the case of lemons in Mexico); (6) avoid traditional wholesale markets to the extent possible, as supermarkets often consider them as delivering low and inconsistent quality at relatively high transaction costs 8 .
The relationship of the new-generation wholesaler or the 3PL firm with the retailer covers the spectrum of coordination levels: (1) the service supplier may operate in loose relationship (nonexclusivity) with the retailer (such as the wholesaler Pedraza with the Soriana chain in Mexico, or FM Logistic (Russian subsidiary of the global logistics firm Faure & Machet, based in France) with the Auchan chain and Danone in Russia); (2) it may be in a long-term tight contract with the retailer (such as Vidimport (a regional multinational based in Mexico) with Wal-mart in Mexico); (3) it may be in the same holding company as the retailer (such as Hortifruti and CSU in Costa Rica); (4) it may start as separate and then be acquired by the retailer (the latter may do this to force exclusivity and capture the profit stream); an example is Konzum's acquiring Vesna in Croatia ; (5) the retailer may use a preferred supplier as a wholesaler; an example is where Wal-mart uses Driscolls, a large berry producer based in California, to supply its Mexico stores from Driscolls' strawberry production in Mexico, as well as (as a wholesaler) to source berries from California in the Mexican off-season.
Retailers generally favor large wholesalers and 3PL firms with transport fleets and depots in wholesale markets throughout the country so that they can supply across several seasons. Examples of 'preferred', specialized and dedicated wholesalers include the Pedraza Company in Mexico (Reardon et al., 2007) and Hortifruti in Costa Rica ).
An extension of the above point is that retailers, in particular regional or global TNC firms, prefer to "import" the services of wholesalers, but especially of 3PL firms, on which they have relied in their home markets and/or globally. This is a spur to globalization of services in support of retail. 9 This is the service sector equivalent of the "follow sourcing" that emerged in global manufacturing in particular in the 1990s, such as in the automotive industries in Brazil and India (see Humphrey, 1999; Salerno et al. 1998) . Moreover, competition within the wholesale sector, combined with the proliferation of (physical) wholesale markets, and the competition within the 8. This is illustrated for Thailand by Boselie (2002) , Indonesia by Natawidjaja et al. (2007) , Central America by Berdegué et al.(2005) , and others. 9. Follow-sourcing of retail-supporting services (as well as retail itself) is part of the general (not food-specific) trend of globalization of services; the latter is discussed for example in Mann (2004) . retail sector which drives cost minimization and quality maximization, in turn drive wholesalers and 3PL firms to set up operations over space within a country or a region, and undertake similar organizational changes that we noted in the case of retailers (systems of distribution centers and warehouses, as well as acquiring stall space in wholesale markets in a number of consumption markets and production zones). As we note below, that is further spurred by supermarket chains requesting or welcoming wholesalers and 3PL firms to co-move/co-locate with them in new markets -an example of "follow-sourcing" as discussed below. We hypothesize that the rise of supermarkets encourages market spatial integration and the various spatial-levels' equivalent of "multinationalization" of distribution companies, all else equal.
In some cases 'follow-sourcing' is purely domestic. In Indonesia, for example, Carrefour asked one of its dedicated wholesalers (Puteri Segar) to set-up in new locations where it was establishing stores (Natawidjaja et al., 2007) . Puteri Segar put in place sourcing networks in these new locations, identifying lead farmers that manage small contract farming schemes.
In other cases, 'follow-sourcing' is regional or global. A fear and complaint of a retailer entering a developing country is often the lack of a developed logistics sector. However, rather than waiting for one to develop 'eventually', this need is usually met quickly by FDI from multinational logistics companies and/or new generation wholesalers. The chains then use these logistics firms to manage their distribution centers, transport, and information flows over the supply chain. This is often done in combination with the use of new-generation wholesalers to handle the transaction components. 10 The multinationalization of retail thus further induces multinationalization of logistics companies, as a 'domino effect' (Hertz and Alfredsson, 2003, and Reardon et al. 2003) . This is a highly under-researched phenomenon, but one that we think is of major importance in terms of the logistics sector transformation in developing countries, and the "fast tracking" objectives of the retailers.
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An illustration from Tesco in the Czech Republic (presented in ) encapsulates the phenomenon. In April 2003, Tesco signed an agreement with the US-based multinational ProLogis for the lease of a large distribution centre in the Czech Republic. The press release is revealing of the symbiosis between multinational retail and logistics firms in entering emerging markets, and the role that the advantage of regional presence plays: "We were looking for a very quick solution to achieve our distribution goals. ProLogis provided a well-suited facility in a very timely and professional manner," said Mark Champagne, supply chain and distribution director for Tesco. 'We look forward to working with ProLogis in the Czech Republic and throughout Central Europe.' 'ProLogis is pleased to be working with Tesco as the 10. An example is the Carrefour distribution center in Brazil, which is the product of a joint venture of Carrefour with Cotia Trading (a major Brazilian wholesaler distributor) and Penske Logistics (a U.S. global multinational firm) started in 2001 (Reardon and Berdegué, 2002) . 11. Note that follow-sourcing also occurs in movements of retailers among developed countries; for example, in its move to the US, Tesco plants to bring along its two British suppliers, Natures Way Foods (for fresh produce and prepared salads) and 2 Sisters Food Group (for poultry) (Chadwell, 2006) . company builds its presence in the Czech Republic,' said Hans van Luijken, first vice president of Central Europe for ProLogis. 'ProLogis Park Prague is a prime example of our goal to establish a presence in the key distribution hubs throughout Europe … as we continue to serve our local and global customers in Central Europe.' ProLogis is a leading provider of distribution facilities and services with 226.7 million square feet (21.1 million square meters) in 1,728 distribution facilities owned, managed and under development in 67 markets in North America, Europe and Japan." (PR Newswire, 2003 , no paging).
The above innovations in the distribution sector are recent. There has as yet been very little research 12 on the effect of the rise of supermarkets on the distribution sector's geography, degree of concentration, or actor differentiation. Such needed research would at the same time show how the economic geography of the development of food distribution is conditioned by retail transformation -in terms of its organization, institutions, concentration, and spatiality.
Retailer Transformation and Local Supply Chain Upgrading
Large and modern retailers, whether they are TNCs or local firms, have often revealed their preference to procure food products from medium and large food manufacturers 13 and farmers where they have access to these, or if not, to the upper tier (in terms of non-land assets) small farmers.
14 If their supply base is small farmers with inadequate assets, however, and the retailer wishes to source locally rather than rely on imports, then the retailer and/or their proxy in the supply chain, such as the processor or the new generation wholesaler, needs to upgrade the capacity of farmers to meet the quality requirements. provide and example of this for the dairy sector in Poland, for example.
The limited evidence points to it being the retail TNCs and the largest domestic retailers who turn to such 'proactive' strategies of supply chain development. Second and third level retailers lack the personnel and financial resources for such investments. The irony is that improvements in the supply chain reduce costs, and allow leading retailers with the necessary capacity to make 12. Natawidjaja et al. (2007) show, for example, preliminary evidence for such consolidation in the produce wholesale sector in West Java. 13. For example, there is evidence of intense symbiosis between large retailers and leading processors in developing countries. A good illustration is the dairy products sector in Brazil (Farina, 2002) . Nestle and Parmalat (and a few large Brazilian firms) grew quickly in the 1990s, essentially taking over the dairy sector, which itself was growing rapidly at the same time that retail sales markets were being rapidly dominated by large retail chains. The large processors needed the sizeable cold display sections and efficient logistics of the retail chains to cut transaction costs. The retailers needed the large supply volume, 'one-stop shopping' for a diversity of products and ease of contracting with large processors. Dries and Reardon (2005) indicate a similar situation, for example, in Russia, this time with the major European dairy companies and the Russian dairy processor Wimm-Bill-Dann. 14. Treating this "development" aspect in depth here is beyond the scope of this paper, but is treated in Reardon and Berdegué (2007) . such investments able to further enhance their competitive position. Below we provide several examples of this emerging proactive strategy.
(1) In Indonesia, Carrefour is working with farmers and wholesalers to build and upgrade supply chains. The other two leading retailers (the Hong Kong-based regional chain Dairy Farm and Matahari the local leading chain) do not yet have these programs. Why has Carrefour taken the lead in this respect? Predominantly, Carrefour has the internal resources (in particular staff from other countries that have relevant experience) and is making efforts to include Indonesia in the list of countries (including Thailand and China) that have suppliers in the "Carrefour Quality Certificate" (Filière Qualité Carrefour). The aim is to reduce reliance on imports and to facilitate export to regional and global supply networks. In addition, Carrefour needs to increase quality and reduce costs in order to enhance its competitive position, while having plans to expand from Java into other Indonesian islands where the supply base is not yet present (Natawidjaja et al., 2007) . (Cavallini, 2006) . Wal-mart and rival local retail leader Reliance are also set to establish microfinance programs for farmers in India (Kurian and Chakravarty (2007) .
Developing country governments usually welcome this proactive supply chain building and development assistance from the private sector. Wrigley et al. (2005) note that the actions of transnational retailers towards upgrading of local supply chains is good politics (allaying local fears and building constituencies of suppliers who "win" with the foreign retailer's presence) in order to ease investment and operating restrictions. We note that they also meet two additional objectives -building supply sources for global supply chains and contributing toward Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) objectives. This sourcing can be stunningly important politically and economically; for example, Carrefour, Wal-mart and Metro source US$ 24.3 billion a year from China through their regional hubs (PlanetRetail, 2006c) .
What methods do retailers employ upgrade local supply chains? First, particularly in the early stages when there are few suppliers that meet their standards, retailers tend to offer a price premium. This is usually calculated to be just above what is needed to cover the costs suppliers incur in meeting the retailer's requirements. Of course, as competition increases in retail markets and more suppliers enter, this margin is whittled down, leading to a 'tug-of-war' between retailers and suppliers.
Second, where there are idiosyncratic credit constraints, retailers may inform and exert pressure on financial institutions to recognize their contracts with suppliers as 'collateral substitutes'. There has been little systematic inventory of these arrangements although, as we note above, such an arrangement by Metro was noted in Croatia to facilitate greenhouse investments by its strawberry producers (Reardon et al., 2003b) .
Third, leading retailers, whether transnational or domestic, institute several organizational and institutional changes to reduce costs and standardize quality in their supply chains.
Finally, retailers draw on partnerships with wholesalers, logistics and processing firms and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and various donor and government projects to help with supply chain improvements. Instrumental here are the recent wave of 'private-public partnerships' and 'business-linkage' programs funded by donors, that subsidize retailers (for example by covering excess sourcing costs) and farmers and processors (for example funding upgrading to meet quality and/or volume requirements of the retailers). This subsidy is usually significant; for example, donors spend some five to 10 times more per farmer than regular government programs in Nicaragua (Balsevich et al., 2006) .
Conclusions
Supermarkets have spread extremely rapidly in developing countries after the 'take-off' in the early to mid-1990s. Former analyses of supermarket diffusion have not adequately explained the sudden burst and then exponential diffusion of supermarkets in the late-1990s and early-2000s. We argue that rather than taking demand and market institutional and organizational conditions as "exogenous", as former analyses have tended to do, modern food retailers instead have treated local conditions as substantially "endogenous".
To enable their rapid growth, supermarkets undertake "proactive fast-tracking strategies" to alter the endogenous "enabling conditions" of entry and growth. Beside the retail investments that have been extensively treated in recent literature, these proactive strategies focus on improving the "enabling conditions" via (1) procurement system modernization and (2) local supply chain development.
One important "fast-tracking" strategy identified in the article that retailers have used to facilitate (1) and (2) is to form symbiotic relationships with modern wholesale, logistics, and processing firms. An example we address is "follow sourcing", where a transnational retailer encourages transnational logistics and wholesale firms with whom the retailer is working in home markets, to locate to the developing country. This is a spur to globalization of services in support of retail.
Follow-sourcing has been treated for example in the automobile manufactures sector (followsourcing from spare parts manufacturers) -but not in the food sector. Much more research is needed on this new topic. It is interesting in itself, first in terms of understanding the dynamics of transnationalization and globalization, and the processes by which the "import of modernization" of the distribution segments may accelerate retail transformation itself. It is also interesting and even crucial from a development perspective because follow-sourcing translates into an accelerated implantation of an array of service sector TNCs in the food sector; that in turn means that massive competitors are suddenly dropped down in the midst of the local food system logistics and wholesale actors, inducing a further round of consolidation and technological, organizational, and institutional change -a shock wave which then eventually affects farmers and rural laborers.
A second important "fast-tracking" strategy identified in the article is that of multi-networksourcing, in which supermarkets source from national, regional, and global networks. It is through this link that the "supermarket revolution" in developing countries affects trade. We analyze that strategy here, adding to the literature which (whether in retail, development, or trade) to date has touched on this theme only scantly. For the first time in the literature, we identify typical paths, present preliminary evidence (from Central America and Indonesia) concerning this multi-sourcing-network strategy, and discuss trade implications. One of the latter is the move to primacy of South-South trade in supermarket sourcing -a new key dimension of globalization. It is probable that competitiveness (and very probably trade policy) debates will have as a primary focus how local South farmers can compete with South-origin imports. This in turn is of obvious interest to the rural development debate. By introducing this link of retailer transformation and trade into the literature, we hope to spur a new line of research that is timely in light of the trade, development, and globalization debates in developing countries.
